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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SUGARHOUSE FINANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 16462

EUGENE L. ANDERSON and
COLLEEN W. ANDERSON,
Defendant-Respondent,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF CASE
On December 17, 1976, Plaintiff-Appellant, Sugarhouse Finance Company (hereafter "Sugarhouse"), obtained a ·
judgment against Defendants-Respondents, Eugene L. Anderson
and Colleen W. Anderson (hereafter "Andersons"), for the
default of a Promissory Note (R. 22-23).

On January 31,

1979, Eugene L. Anderson (hereafter "Anderson") approached
Sugarhouse to settle the judgment.

Anderson alleged that a

valid settlement had been reached and that it should be
enforced by the Court.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable Christine M. Durham granted Andersons' motion to enforce the alleged settlement agreement,
and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
to that effect.
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experlenced health problems resulting in extreme medical
expenses (R. 95-96, 101), and that he was presently considering taking out bankruptcy as he was under a great deal of
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financial pressure (R. 96, 101).

Mr. Anderson represented

to Mr. Petty that he did not have any assets (R. 118).
Based upon Anderson's representations, Anderson and Sugarhouse agreed to settle the judgment for the sum of $2,200.00
(R.

38, 90, 111-112, 115).
After negotiating this agreement with Appellant,

Anderson tendered a check payable to Neuman C. Petty, personally (R. 90, 119).

The check was dated January 31, 1979,

and was drawn on Zions First Natio_nal Bank, Salina, Utah,
with the notation "payment in full, judgment Civil No.
236207."

(See Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, a-nd R. 38, 90).
After negotiations were completed, Anderson in-

formed Sugarhouse that he did not have sufficient funds in
his account to cover the check but that he would attempt to
make arrangements with his bank to obtain payment (R. 104,
115, 119).

Anderson indicated he would call Mr. Petty the

following day to report on whether or not the check would be
honored (R. 115, 119).

Respondent Eugene Anderson did not

telephone Appellant on February 1, 1979, but did contact Mr.
Petty on the following day (R. 91, 115, 119).
Prior to being served with the Order in Supplemental Proceedings, Anderson was in the process of closing a
real estate transaction (R. 90, 99, 110).

Anderson and one

Keith Cannon owned an interest in twelve acres of real
property located in Aurora, Sevier County, Utah, and were
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- 4 attempting to sell four acres of said property to a third
party (R. 99, 107, 108).

Anderson was cognizant of Sugar-

house's judgment being a cloud upon the title of the Anderson-Cannon property (R. 90, 99, 111).

Anderson knew that

the real estate sale could not be closed until the judgment
was satisfied (R. 90-91, 110-111).

All monies for the

completion of the real estate transaction had been deposited
in escrow pending the resolution of Sugarhouse's judgment
against Andersons (R. 109-110).

Anderson was to receive

approximately $2,000 from the closing of the transaction (R.
90-91, 107).

The existence of the real property and the

pending real estate transaction was not disclosed to Sugarhouse (R. 91, 99-100).
After meeting with Respondent Anderson, Petty
received a telephone call from a title company indicating
that Anderson was in the process of selling a parcel of real
property (R. 116).

The title company requested a release

from the Sugarhouse Finance Company judgment (R. 116).

Mr.

Petty declined to provide the title company with the requested ·release (R. 116).
On the morning of February 2, 1979, Sugarhouse returned the check for $2,200.00 to Anderson by mail (R. 91,
116).

Later that same date, Anderson telephoned Sugarhouse

(R. 91, 115-116).

Petty informed Anderson that his check

had been returned and that Sugarhouse would not accept the
check as settlement of the judgment as Anderson had not been
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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candid with him regarding Anderson's financial status during
their settlement negotiations (R. 91, 100, 111, 117).
Respondent received the check by mail on February 3, 1979
(R.

38).
On February 8, 1978, Andersons filed a pleading in

the same action,entitled "Motion", requesting the Court for
"an order

requir~ng

the plaintiff to carry·out and complete

the terms of the settlement entered into by the parties on
January 31, 1979" (R. 40-42).

The Court heard Andersons'

motion, as well as the Court's order in supplemental proceedings, on March 13, 1979.

At the hearing, counsel for

Sugarhouse objected to the hearing of Andersons' motion on
the grounds that the matter was not properly before the
Court, that a summary hearing of the issues presented in the
motion was not proper, and that the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the issues raised by Andersons' motion (R.
63-64).

The Court granted the Motion and entered Findings

of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order to the effect that
Sugarhouse must accept the sum of $2,200.00 as full satisfaction of the judgment.

On May 9, 1979, Sugarhouse moved

the Court for a new trial and relief from the Court's order
relating to the hearing of March 13, 1979 (R. 66-67).

In

response to Sugarhouse's motion, the Court held a hearing
and thereafter entered Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 89-92).
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- 6 ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE FINDINGS OF FACT DO NOT SUPPORT THE COURT'S
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER.
The trial court entered certain findings in its

Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 90-91).
Pertinent to this appeal are all such Findings and Conclusions, but especially Findings 6, 7, 8 and 12, as follows:
6. At the time defendant was served with the
supplemental order referred to in paragraph 2 hereof,
defendant was anticipating the closing of a sale of
real property in which he had one-half interest as a
tenant in common, and from which defendant Eugene L.
Anderson was to receive $2,000 after payment of the
underlying indebtedness.
7. Defendant Eugene L. Anderson knew that plaintiff's judgment had been docketed as a judgment lien
upon all real property belonging to defendants or in
which they had an interest in Sevier County.
8. Defendant Eugene L. Anderson did not disclose
to President of plaintiff the fact that he had an
interest in property, that the property had been sold,
and that he was anticipating the closing of the sale of
property and that defendant Eugene L. Anderson was to
receive the sum of $2,000 from the sale thereof.
(R.
90-91.)

12. The agreement entered into by the parties on
January 31, 1979, was based on an adequate consideration and was fully executed by each of them at the time
of its inception.
(R. 91.)
Finding No. 12 as quoted above of is actually a
conclusion of law.

There is no evidence nor are there

findings to support a conclusion of consideration.

This

point is discussed in Point I.A of Appellant's Brief.
Findings of Fact Nos. 6 through 8, inclusive, together with the record which shows

misrepresentation on
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- 7 the part of Anderson, are cited as the basis of Point I.B of
Appellant's Brief.
A.

The Settlement Agreement Lacked Consideration to
Support an Accord and Satisfaction.
On January 29, 1979, Anderson met with Sugarhouse's

President, Mr. Neuman C. Petty, in an attempt to settle
Sugarhouse's undisputed and liquidated judgment of December 17, 1976.

A~derson

informed Mr. Petty· that he did not

have any assets and was caught in a difficult financial
situation.

Based upon such representations (and others

discussed in Point I.B hereof), Mr. Petty on behalf of
Sugarhouse agreed to settle the judgment for a compromise
sum of $2,200.00.

Upon reaching this agreement based upon

Anderson's representations, Anderson tendered Sugarhouse a
check for $2,200.00.

Anderson then informed Sugarhouse's

President that he did not have sufficient funds in his
account to cover the check.

Anderson stated he would

telephone Mr. Petty after contacting the bank and apprise
Mr. Petty of whether or not the bank would honor the check.
Anderson did not call Mr. Petty on February 1, 1979.

Mr.

Petty did not attempt to negotiate the check,· but rather
returned the settlement check to Anderson on the morning of
February 2, 1979, and the check was received by Anderson on
February 3, 1979.

When Anderson telephoned Mr. Petty on

February 2, 1979, Mr. Petty informed Anderson that the
settlement agreement was rescinded and that the settlement
check had previously been returned to Anderson.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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An accord and satisfaction is a new contract
between the debtor and creditor which must be supported by
consideration as one of four essential elements of the
See Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building

contract.

& Loan Association, 94 Utah 97, 75 P.2d 669, 676 (1938).
See also 1 Am.Jur.2d, Accord and Satisfaction, §12 at 310311 (1962).

With .regard to the subject of consideration,

the Badger court cited the rule as follows:
"An accord is an agreement between parties, one to
give or perform, the other to receive or accept,
such agreed payment or performance in satisfaction
of a claim. The "satisfaction" is the consummation of such agreement.
Where the claim is
definite and no dispute but an admittance of its
owing, the agreement to take a lesser amount even
followed by satisfaction is not good unless attended by some consideration."
(75 P.2d at 676.)
See also F.M.A. Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., 17
U.2d 80, 404 P.2d 670, 672-673 (1965); 1 Am.Jur.2d, Accord
and Satisfaction, §12 at 310-311 (1962).
This Court in Tates, Inc. v. Little America Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1975), held that defendant's
evidence failed to amount to an accord and satisfaction of
the claim for the sale of a motor vehicle.

Although the

matter before the Court concerned a disputed claim, the
Court articulated principles of law which are helpful in
resolving the issue before this Court:
Ordinarily, the payment of part of a debt does not
discharge it; and this is true even though the
paying debtor exacts a promise that it will do so,
The reason for this is that in making the part
payment, the debtor is doing nothing more than he
is legally obligated to do, and therefore he gives
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 9 the creditor no consideration for the promise that
the part payment will be accepted to discharge the
entire debt.
(535 P. 2d at 1229.)
The Court proceeded to hold that a further requirement of an
accord and satisfaction is that there be a dispute or uncertainty as to the amount due.

The case before this Court in-

valves an undisputed, liquidated claim.

Therefore, as a

matter of law, a payment for less than the full amount does
not constitute valid consideration.

See also Clark Leasing

Corp. v. White Sands Forest Products, Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 535
P.2d 1077, 1079 (1975), wherein the Court rejected the
debtor's defense of accord and satisfaction for an undisputed, liquidated claim and held that "an agreement on the
part of one to do what he is already legally bound to do is
not sufficient consideration for the promise of another."
Similarly, the Court in Parmeter v. Delk, 433
S.W.2d 941 (Ct.Civ.App. Texas, 1968), held that the cashing
of a check marked "payment in full" which was drawn for less
than the full amount of the liquidated debt does not constitute an accord and satisfaction because it lacked consideration.
In case of liquidated claims, where the full
amount of the claim is not paid and no additional
or substituted consideration is shown, no accord
or satisfaction results.
•
Also the mere
payment and acceptance of a sum of money less ~han
the amount of an undisputed indebtedness due, in
full satisfaction of the debt, does not, for want
of consideration constitute an accord and satisfaction and doe~ not bar the creditor's suit to
recover' the balance.
(433 S.W.2d at 944; citation
omitted.)
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- 10 In addition, Anderson tendered a check to Sugarhouse without sufficient funds to authorize the payment of
the check from Anderson's bank account.

It is well es tab-

lished that a worthless instrument has no value and does not
constitute consideration for the purpose of establishing a
contractual agreement.

See Dakota Transfer & Storage

Merchants National Bank

&

Co.~

64~

Trust Co., 86 N. W. 2d 639, 643,

(N.D. 1957); 11 Am.Jur.2d, Bills and Notes, §236 at 264
(1963).
The instant debt was an undisputed and liquidated

1/

claim as evidenced by the judgment of December 17, 1976.

agreement by Sugarhouse as creditor does not discharge the
whole debt as the creditor receives what he is entitled
and there is no consideration for any new agreement.

~

See

F.M.A. Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., supra, 404 P.2dl
at 672-73.

A partial payment, although offered as payment

in full, does not operate as a satisfaction.

See F.M.A.

Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., supra, 404 P.2d 670
(1965); Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building and LoM
Association, supra; A. Corbin, 6 Corbin on Contracts, §12811

I

at 135 (1962).
The case before the Court presents no basis fora
finding of consideration.

I
There is no dispute to be settlec!

as the amount in controversy is a liquidated, undisputed
claim.

In sum, the record is devoid of any new considera·

tion by the debtor which would amount to an accord and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The tender of a check for an amount less than

the full judgment is merely the performance, in part, of a
present obligation, and does not constitute new consideration.
B.

Any Settlement Agreement Between the Parties Was
Tainted by Fraud, Misrepresentation or Deceit and
Therefore Subject to Rescission.
Anderson and the President of Sugarhouse met to

discuss the liquidated claim of Sugarhouse, namely the
judgment of Sugarhouse against Anderson.

Anderson repre-

sented to Petty that he was heavily in debt and did not have
any assets.

Based upon these representations and others,

Sugarhouse agreed to accept $2,200.00 as a full settlement
of its judgment against Andersons.

Anderson failed to

.disclose to Sugarhouse the fact that he was in the process
of closing a real estate transaction from which he would
personally realize approximately $2,000.00.

Sugarhouse was

only apprised of Anderson's real estate holdings when Mr.
Petty received a telephone call from the title company which
was closing the transaction.

At the time Anderson met with

the President of Sugarhouse, Anderson was aware of the fact
that Sugarhouse's judgment was a cloud upon the title of
this property and the sale of the real property could not be
closed until the judgment was satisfied.
Only Anderson an.a his business associates and
agents were aware of the existence of the previously described
real estate transaction. Sugarhouse relied upon
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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- 12 Anderson's representations that he had no assets as being
true when Sugarhouse agreed to accept settlement of the
judgment in an amount less than the judgment.

Where such

representations were untrue and known by Anderson to be
untrue at the time they were made, the accord and satisfaction based upon such representation is not binding.
Ralph A. Badger

~

Co. v. Fidelity Building and Loan

tion, 94 Utah 97, 75 P.2d 669, 679

See
Associ~

(1938).

It is well established by Utah case law that an
accord and satisfaction of a liquidated debt procured by
fraud or misrepresentation is not binding upon the parties.
In Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building and Loan Association, supra, Badger brought an action to recover the
difference between the face amount of a certificate and the
amount Badger had received for the certificate from Atlas
Realty"co., an agent of Fidelity.

Badger's claim was for a

liquidated amount as evidenced by the certificate and Fideli
admitted to owing Badger the stated amount.

When the certi-

ficates matured, Badger sought to redeem the certificates
for the~r stated value.

Badger was informed that the certi-

ficates were not due and payable as there were $50,000 of
withdrawals ahead of Badger's certificate and, second, that
Fidelity had decided to pay off certain creditors' obligations before disbursing funds for stock withdrawals.
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Fidell

- 13 then offered fifty percent of the face value of the certificate in exchange for surrender of the certificate.

The

information conveyed to Badger was not true and Fidelity
knew that it was not true.

Badger relied upon the fraudu-

lent information as evidenced by his surrendering of the
certificate and accepting less than the full amount.
upon the

informa~ion

Based

conveyed to Badger this Court held as

follows:
Where the accord and satisfaction relied upon
was procured by fraud or misrepresentation . . . ,
i t is not binding
We conclude, from what has been said, that
there was no accord and satisfaction binding upon
plaintiff, and that in the facts of this case, it
would be highly unjust to permit the defendant to
retain that which otherwise should have been paid
to plaintiff. We do not find anything in the
record that should estop plaintiff from recovering
the balance unpaid on the certificate.
The
records of the defendant revealed that plaintiff's
certificate was due and payable and defendant had
funds on hand with which to pay it.
(75 P.2d at
678-9; citations omitted.)
To be valid, a contract of accord and satisfaction
must have been consummated fairly and honestly; if procured
by fraud or misrepresentation, it is voidable at the option
and instance of the aggrieved party and may be rescinded
upon discovery of the facts provided the aggrieved party
acts promptly.

1 Am.Jur.2d, Accord and Satisfaction, §24 at

322-23, citing Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building
and Loan Association.
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- 14 In Whitney v. Richards, 17 Utah 226, 53 P. 1122
(1898), Richards defaulted on a promissory note and pleaded
accord and satisfaction as a defense to the collection
action by Whitney.

The alleged settlement agreement of the

parties was based upon false representations by Richards.
Whitney was informed by Richards that she would probably be
unable to

callee~

the liquidated amount of the note unless

she agreed to the settlement.

Real property was to be

deeded ta the creditor about which Richards made misrepresentations as to the value of the land, its potential rental
value, and also failed to declare that the title was encumbered with trust deeds.

The Court held that the alleged

accord and satisfaction was obtained by fraudulent representations which Whitney relied upon and that such fraud
authorized Whitney to disaffirm and rescind the settlement
agreement.
It is hornbook law that fraud is a sufficient
basis for the vacation or reformation of an accord.

See

A. Corbin, 6 Corbin on Contracts, §1292 at 178 (1962).
See also. 47 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, §1036 at 113 (1969);
Annot., Grounds for Vacation of Satisfaction of Judgment, 51
A.L.R. 243, 244 (1927).

Where one party has superior means

of ascertaining the facts relating to a settlement agreement
and fails to disclose the true state of affairs to the oth~
party, the lack of disclosure may be treated as fraud and
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- 15 may constitute a basis for invalidating a compromise settlement.

See Creson v. Carmody, 310 Ky. 861, 222 S.W.2d 935

(1949).
In this case, the Court specifically found that
Anderson failed to disclose to Sugarhouse the fact that
Andersons had assets and that the closing of a sale of the
real property was. awaiting satisfaction of the Sugarhouse
judgment (R. 90-91).

In addition, Anderson claimed to have

no assets when in fact he had a substantial interest in the
real property.

He was to receive $2,000 from the sale of

four acres and would have eight acres left thereafter.
Under all of the foregoing authority, the agreement of
Sugarhouse, based upon Anderson's false misrepresentations,
was subject to rescission at Sugarhouse's election.

Notice

of that election was timely given and Anderso·n' s check
returned.
The trial court's conclusions that the agreement
was supported by consideration and was valid and binding
must be reversed.
POINT II. ANDERSONS FAILED TO MEET THEIR BURDEN OF PLEADING
AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
After Sugarhouse rejected Anderson's settlement
offer and returned their check on February 2, 1979, Andersons served Sugarhouse with a pleading entitled "Motion"
which was supported by an affidavit, dated February 8, 1979.
The motion was not made pursuant to any rule or statute, but
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- 16 simply requested the Court "for an order requiring the
plaintiff to carry out and complete the terms of the settlement entered into by the parties on January 31, 1979."
Andersons appear to be relying upon an accord and satisfaction to obtain the equitable relief of specific performance.
Professor Corbin defines the burden and requirements of
proving such a doctrine.
Ac~ord and satisfaction is properly an affi~
mative defense; it must be specifically pleaded
and the burden of proof with respect to every
element of it is on the party alleging it as a
defense.
(A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, §1280
at 134-5 (1962); footnote omitted.)

The elements of accord and satisfaction are enumerated in
Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building and Loan
tion, 94 Utah 97, 75 P.2d 669

Associ~

(1938), as follows:

(1) A proper subject matter, (2) competent parties,
(3) an assent or meeting of the minds of the
parties, and (4) a consideration.
(75 P.2d at
676.)
In Simmons v. Langston, 241 Miss. 36, 128 So.2d
749 (1961), the Court, quoting Corbin on Contracts, held
that the seller of an automobile was entitled to a deficiency judgment against the buyer for the balance due on a
repossessed automobile when the buyer failed to carry his
burden of proving an accord and satisfaction.

The Court

rejected buyer's arguments that an alleged conversation
between buyer and seller wherein seller made arrangements 0
repossess the motor vehicle were sufficient to prove an
accord and satisfaction.
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- 17 The burden of proving an accord and satisfaction is upon one who maintains the affirmative
of that issue.
It is said that the evidence must
be "clear and unequivocal" in order to support
such a finding. . . .
(128 So.2d at 750; citations omitted.)
Andersons were charged with maintaining the affirmative on the issue of proving an accord and satisfaction by
clear and unequivocal evidence.

Andersons' untitled motion

of February 8, 1979, requesting the Court to enforce an
alleged accord and satisfaction, appears to be inadequate on
its face to satisfy the previously described burden.

The

motion and trial court record are devoid of any evidence of
consideration that would satisfy the fourth element of the
cause of action as described in Badger above.

A record

without clear and convincing evidence of consideration fails
to satisfy the burden of the previously described authority
and warrants a reversal of the trial court's order.
POINT III.APPELLANT WAS NOT AFFORDED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCOVERY TO DETERMINE THE PARAMETERS OF RESPONDENTS'
CAUSE OF ACTION
Sugarhouse obtained a judgment against Anderson
for the default of a promissory note in the Third District
Court, Civil No. 236307.

On January 29, 1979, Anderson was

served with an order in supplemental proceedings in the same
case as the original cause of action.
Anderson, on his own initiative and without mandate of the Court, met informally with Mr. Petty of Sugarhouse on January 31, 1979, in an attempt to settle the
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dispute.

18 -

Based on Anderson's representations, the parties

reached an agreement regarding satisfaction of the judgment.
Anderson sought to enforce an alleged accord and satisfaction by serving Sugarhouse with a pleading entitled "Motioo"
requesting the Court "for an order requiring the plaintiff
to carry out and complete the terms of the settlement entered
into by the parties on January 31, 1979."
action was filed

~y

No separate

Anderson to enforce the so-called

"settl~

ment" as the motion was pleaded in the same case in which
appellant obtained a judgment against the respondent.

No

complaint was filed by respondent in addition to their
motion.

No authority was cited as the basis for filing such

an action.

Prior to the hearing on Anderson's motion,

Sugarhouse was not afforded an opportunity for discovery

~

determine the extent of Anderson's assets and liabilities or
otherwise engage in discovery regarding the substance of
Andersons' motion.

Sugarhouse's objections to the Court's

lack of jurisdiction and improper procedures and hearing
were rejected by the trial court.
This Court has held that the discovery provisions
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure should be liberally
construed to simplify and streamline trial procedures and to
eliminate the element of surprise in all civil litigation.
See Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 U.2d 189, 429 P.2d 39 (1967}.
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- 19 [The) purpose [of the Rules of Civil Procedure) is
to make procedure as simple and efficient as
possible by eliminating any useless ritual undue
rigidities, or technicalities which may ha~e
become engrafted in our law; and to remove elements of surprise or trickery so the parties and
the court can determine the facts and resolve the
issues as directly, fairly and expeditiously as
possible.
(429 P.2d at 40.)
The Court proceeded to quote from Rule l(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Pr?cedure which prefaces the entire set of
rules by stating that the rules "shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."

(Emphasis added.)

In a case factually similar to Ellis, the Court
noted that the "avowed purpose" of the rules of procedure
"is to establish the 'truth' and require 'full disclosure'"·
See Ash v. Farwell, 37 F.R.D. SS3, SSS (D.Kan. 196S).

With

reference to Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, the
Court noted that discovery "permits a more realistic appraisal of the case and undoubtedly leads to settlement of
cases which otherwise would go to trial."
In commenting upon the propriety of the discovery
request for the production of documents, the Court in
Alseike v. Miller, 196 Kan. S47, 412 P.2d 1007 (1966), held
as follows;
Discovery has a vital role in our code of civil
procedure with its notice type pleading and its
basic philosophy that mutual knowledge of a~l
relevant facts is essential to the proper disposal
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- 20 of litigation and that prior to trial every par~
to a civil action is entitled to disclosure of all
such information in the possession of any personunless the information is privileged . . . Our ~
code of civil procedure is to be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action . .
(412 P.2d
at 1014; citations omitted; emphasis added.)
Lawsuits to enforce an alleged accord and satisfaction are usually commenced by filing a complaint where
the discovery rul,es and techniques are made available to all
litigants.

The procedural posture created by the filing of

Andersons' motion and the Court's denial of Sugarhouse's
objections to jurisdiction, procedure, mode of hearing and
denial of discovery, did not afford Sugarhouse a "just"
determination of "every action" as mandated by Rule 1 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The avowed purpose of the

Rules was thwarted when Sugarhouse was unable to require the
full disclosure through appropriate discovery of the nature
of Andersons' case and an opportunity to determine the
extent of their assets and liabilities.
The trial court's failure to apply the Rules of
Civil Procedure to aid Sugarhouse in the defense of Andersons' action based upon an alleged accord and ·satisfaction,
is a basic denial of a civil litigant's rights as codified
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Sugarhouse Finance
Company prays for reversal of the trial court's order, or in
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- 21 the alternative, for a new trial, and that Sugarhouse be
awarded its costs.
DATED this 6th day of August, 1979.
Respectfully submitted,
MOYLE & DRAPER

By~-::-:,---~--::,---=-~~~~~~~
Wayne G. Petty

By~-=~---.-=,--=-~~~~~~~
Royal I. Hansen
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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